Last of the Speakeasies?

Big news from a little place. One of the last vestiges of the prohibition-era speakeasies of the first half of the last century has left the scene in Canada’s smallest province. 
CBC PEI reports:

In 1900 Prince Edward Island became the first province to ban alcohol. It was the last to end prohibition almost 50 years later. However, there continued to be dozens of bootleggers around the province…

It seems Charlottetown’s bootleggers have raised the white flag, choosing to close their illegal establishments in the face of tough new legislation passed by the Binns government. The bootleggers run illegal bars in homes. The houses are gutted, a bar is put in, and the people who run them resell liquor and beer. They don’t have liquor licences, and don’t conform to any provincial or municipal laws. They’ve been raided, railed against and reviled. But mostly, they’ve been tolerated, selling booze for much cheaper prices than legal lounges and nightclubs. That’s until this past weekend, when the doors of the known bootlegging establishments in Charlottetown were suddenly locked.

The writing has been on the wall for these illegal bars – one of which is illustrated as shown on the CBC PEI website – for a few years since a man died at a table and was not detected as being dead for some time. It is interesting to note, however, that on the main street of Ogdensburg, NY, one of the last holdouts of British North America in what is now the eastern USA, these sorts of small home-sized bars do operate under license as one might also see in St. John’s Newfoundland. With any luck they will become similarly licensed in PEI but that may destroy some of the attraction to their customers who took advantage of after-hours drinking and unregulated low pricing.

Of somewhat finer interest is the use of “bootlegger” in PEI for an illegal bar. Growing up in Nova Scotia it meant an illegal retailer only.

Stone Brewing, San Diego, California

Two devils for two snowman
 

Two more from Stone Brewing of San Diego: Double Bastard Ale and Smoked Porter. A couple of months ago, I reviewed Arrogant Bastard here and Ruination IPA here.

The Double Bastard poured deep tea in colour with a beige head. It has the richness of Arrogant Bastard simplictor with something more of the hop whallop of Ruination. It is hot with massive malty flavours of tobacco, leather ballglove, apple butter and fig. Heavy body. At 10% alcohol it ought to whallop but it is a well blanketed bat that strikes. Comfort then good night. Here is what the advocation is saying.

The Smoked Porter was deep garnet, its rich smokiness not overwhelming and not really much in the finish. Below the molassesy deep malt there was some surprisingly fresh grape juiciness, then cola, then dates all laced with the reek. At 5.9% is is one of the more modest Stone brews. Not one of the BA’ers has a bad word to say about it. I think I had a pint of this on tap when I was in Vancouver in 1998 at The Whip, one of the nation’s finer spots, with my pal Robyn on a Saturday afternoon before we retired to Granville Island Market for rhubarb pie. Maybe these happy happy men who teach a beer class at UBC are occassional Whiperonians.

Napping

Upon being wakened by herself, I was told that my father, both my brothers and my son were all snoozing this afternoon at various locations throughout the clan’s compound catching up from the rigours of train travel and watching fitba on the TV over mugs of tea. Were every afternoon so well spent. Once my auntie, over from the homeland, rose from a nap at the cottage and pronounced upon joining the rest that, if the Olympics allowed for it, she could sleep for Scotland. Know your strengths, I say.

Dubya the Canadian

I read this morning about what George W. Bush said about lawsuits and the need to cut back on awards being ordered in personal injury cases:

“The costs of frivolous lawsuits in some cases make it prohibitively expensive for a small business to stay in business or for a doctor to practice medicine, in which case it means the health care costs of a job provider or job creator is escalating,” Bush said. Bush spoke at a two-day White House economic conference, reiterating his oft-stated plea for Congress to impose caps on legal awards. “Justice ought to be fair,” the president said. “Those who have been hurt ought to have their day in court. But a judicial system run amok is one that makes it really hard for small businesses to stay in business.”

What a nut, I thought as I always do as a knee-jerk, me being a mere pawn caught between the propagandist intercessions of broadcast news and talk radio. But then I realized on this point he is just being a good Canadian. The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in the case Ratych v. Bloomer, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 940 found the following:

It is a fundamental principle of tort law that an injured person should be compensated for the full amount of his loss, but no more. This is implicit in the principles governing the recovery of damages for personal injury set forth by this Court in the trilogy of Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229, Thornton v. Prince George School Board, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 267, and Arnold v. Teno, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 287. In the trilogy this Court affirmed that the purpose of awarding damages in tort is to put the injured person in the same position as he or she would have been in had the tort not been committed, in so far as money can do so. The plaintiff is to be given damages for the full measure of his loss as best that can be calculated. But he is not entitled to turn an injury into a windfall. In each case the task of the Court is to determine as nearly as possible the plaintiff’s actual loss. With respect to non-pecuniary damages, the task is necessarily imprecise, and resort must often be had to conventional figures. But where pecuniary damages are at issue, it is the actual pecuniary loss sustained by the plaintiff which governs the amount of the award. The functional rational for the award of damages adopted in the trilogy of Andrews, Thornton and Teno underlines the necessity of using the plaintiff’s actual loss as the basis of his or her damages. The award is justified, not because it is appropriate to punish the defendant or enrich the plaintiff, but because it will serve the purpose or function of restoring the plaintiff as nearly as possible to his pre-accident state or alternatively, where this cannot be done, providing substitutes for what he has lost.

All the US wants is something we have which is not water or mile after mile of untouched woods. Prudence and common sense.

Early PIPEDA Appeal Ruling

For those of us trying to keep up with the meaning of the newish Personal Information and Protection and Electronic Documents Act, the ruling of the Federal Court of Appeal in Englander v. Telus is interesting for its ennunciation alone. One interesting point to note is a statement in relation to the somewhat daft but perhaps brilliant use of lay language in the key schedule to the statute:

[45] The Court is sometimes left with little, if any guidance at all. Clause 4.3, for example, requires knowledge and consent “except where appropriate.” Clause 4.3.4 sets up a standard of “sensitivity of the information,” only to add that “any information can be sensitive, depending on the context.” Clause 4.3.5 then goes on to say that “[i]n obtaining consent, the reasonable expectations of the individual are also relevant.”

[46] All of this to say that, even though Part 1 and Schedule 1 of the Act purport to protect the right of privacy, they also purport to facilitate the collection, use and disclosure of personal information by the private sector. In interpreting this legislation, the Court must strike a balance between two competing interests. Furthermore, because of its non-legal drafting, Schedule 1 does not lend itself to typical rigorous construction, In these circumstances, flexibility, common sense and pragmatism will best guide the Court.

This is the first higher court ruling which I have seen on the statute and marks the beginning of the interpretation of its principles which will flesh out the meaning of privacy in the private sector in common law Canada. Quebec, as we all know, operates under the civil code system, has had its own statute for a decade and protects privacy in the Quebec Charter of Rights and Freedoms. A more private place.